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Context and Case Study

Open smart cards
A new type of smart cards is getting more and more attractive: multiapplication smart cards. The main characteristics of such cards are that applications can be loaded after the card issuance and that several applications run on the same card. A few operating systems have been proposed to manage multiapplication smart cards, namely Java Card 1 , Multos 2 and more recently Smart Cards for Windows 3 . In this paper, we will focus on Java Card. Following this standard, applications for multiapplication smart cards are implemented as interacting Java applets.
Case study
A typical example of a multiapplication smart card is an electronic purse with one purse applet and two loyalty applets: a frequent flyer (Air France) application and a car rental (RentaCar) loyalty program. The purse applet manages debit and credit operations and keeps a log of all the transactions. As several moneys can be used (francs and euros for example) this applet also manages a conversion table. When the card owner wants to subscribe to a loyalty program, the corresponding loyalty applet is loaded on the card. This applet must be able to interact with the purse to get to know the transactions made by the purse in order to update loyalty points according to these transactions. For instance, the Air France applet will add miles to the account of the card owner whenever an Air France ticket is bought with the purse. The card owner can use these miles to buy a discounted Air France ticket. Agreements may also exist between loyalty applets to allow exchanges of points. For instance, loyalty points granted by RentaCar could be summed with Air France miles to buy a discounted ticket.
The electronic purse has been chosen as case study for our project. It has been implemented in Java by Gemplus. 
Security Concerns
Security is always a big concern for smart cards but it is all the more important with multiapplication smart cards and post issuance code downloading. Multiapplication smart cards involve several participants: the card provider, the card issuer that proposes the card to the users, application providers and card holders (users). The card issuer is usually considered responsible for the security of the card. The card issuer does not trust application providers: applets could be malicious or simply faulty. Java Security functions like the byte code verifier or the security manager [7] were designed to prevent malicious applets from damaging local ressources. These functions carefully isolate a malicious applet from other applets and from sensitive ressources. To allow the development of multi-application smart cards, the JavaCard has introduced a new way for applets to interact directly. An applet can invoke another applet method through a shared interface. In the electronic purse application, the purse applet has a shared interface for loyalty applets to get their transactions and the loyalty applet has a shared interface for partner loyalty applets to get loyalty points. As applet interaction is outside the scope of usual Java security functions, Java card defined a new security function called the applet firewall [11] . This security function controls that only methods in a shared interface can be called.
We suppose that all the relevant Java and JavaCard security functions are used in the electronic purse. But these functions do not cover all the threats. We are especially interested in threats particular to multiapplication smart cards like illicit applet interactions. An example of illicit interaction in the case of the electronic purse is described on the following scheme: A "logfull" service is proposed by the purse to the loyalty applets: when the transaction log is full, the purse calls the logf ull method of the loyalty applets that subscribed to the service to warn them that the log is full and they should get the transactions before some of them are erased and replaced by new ones. We suppose the Air France applet subscribed to the logfull service, but the RentaCar applet did not. When the log is full, the purse calls the logf ull method of the Air France applet. In this method, the Air France applet gets transactions from the purse but also wants to update its extended balance that contains its points plus all the points it can get from its loyalty partners. To update this extended balance, it calls the getbalance method of the RentaCar loyalty applet. In that case, the car rental applet can guess that the log is full when the Air France applet calls its getbalance method and thus get the transactions from the purse.
There is a leak of information from the Air France applet to the RentaCar one and we want to be able to detect such illicit information flows.
This illicit behaviour would not be countered by the applet firewall as all the invoked methods belong to shared interfaces. Our goal is to provide techniques and tools enabling the card issuer to verify that new applets respect existing security properties defined as authorized applet interactions. The approach can be described by the following scheme: If the applet provider wants to load a new applet on a card, he provides the bytecode for this applet. The card issuer has a security policy for the card and security properties that must be satisfied. We provide techniques and tools to decide whether the properties are satisfied by the new applet (these techniques are applied on the applet bytecode). If the properties hold, the applet can be loaded on the card; if they do not hold, it is rejected.
Multi-application Security Policy
To implement this applet certification approach, we first have to choose a security policy adapted to multiapplication cards and associated security properties.
Security policy
We propose to use a multilevel security policy [3] that was designed for multiapplication smart cards. Each applet provider is assigned a security level and we consider special levels for shared data. On the example of the electronic purse, we have a level for each applet: AF for Air France, P for purse and RC for RentaCar and levels for shared data: AF + RC for data shared by Air France and RentaCar, AF + P for data shared by Air France and purse, etc. The relation between levels is used to authorize or forbid information flows between applets. In the policy we consider, AF + P AF and AF + P P , this means that information whose level is AF +P is authorized to flow towards information whose level is P or AF . So shared information from Air France and Purse may be received by Air France and Purse applets. To model that applets may only communicate through shared interfaces, direct flows between levels AF , P and RC are forbidden. The levels together with the relation have a lattice structure, so there are a bottom level public and a top level private. The following picture shows some of the authorized information flows. 
Security properties
Now we have to define the security properties to be enforced. We have chosen the secure dependency model [1] that applies to systems where malicious applications might communicate confidential information to other applications. Like other information flow models such as non-interference [4] , this model ensures that dependencies between system variables cannot be exploited to establish an indirect communication channel. We apply this model to the electronic purse: illicit interactions will be detected by controlling the dependencies between variables of the system. To apply this model we should first be able to associate a security level with input and output variables and check that the value of a variable whose security level is l depends on the value of variables whose security level is dominated by l. This means that any pair of runs of the program starting with the same values for all variables whose level is dominated by l should compute the same values for variables whose level is l. This property is not easy to check with computer aided verification tools so we use sufficient conditions that are better handled by these tools.
It is easy to compute for each variable of the program the set of variables it syntactically depends on. As the values of these variables determine the values computed by the program, it is sufficient to prove that a variable whose security level is l syntactically depends on variables with a security level dominated by l.
Because it is not always possible to associate a security level with all the variables we define the computed level of a variable. The computed level of an input variable is its security level. Otherwise, the computed level is the least upper bound of the computed levels of variables the variable syntactically depends on. To check security it is sufficient to prove that, in any state of the program, the computed level of a variable is dominated by its security level.
As we want to use model checkers to verify the security properties, it is important to restrict the size of value domains in order to avoid state explosions during verifications. To check security, it is sufficient to prove that the previous property holds in any state of an abstracted program where variable values are replaced with variable computed levels.
Applet Certification
Global Analysis Technique
There are two issues in order to be able to apply the approach in practice: what are the variables we are able to associate a security level with? and what is the program we have to consider ? ( one method of one applet, all the methods in one applet, all the methods in all the applets on the card)?
We are able to associate security levels with applet attributes and with method invokations between applets. By default, we associate level AF (resp. P and RC) with all the attributes of Air France (resp. Purse and RentaCar) applet. As Air France can invoke the getbalance or debit methods of RentaCar, we assign the shared security level RC + AF to these interactions. Similarly, as the Purse applet can invoke the logf ull method of Air France, we associate level AF + P to this interaction. And we associate level P + AF (resp. P + RC) to the invocation of getT ransaction method of the Purse applet by the Air France applet (resp. by RentaCar applet). We have decided to analyse one method invokation at a time. We propose an assume-guarantee discipline that allows to verify methods locally on each applet even if the method calls methods in other applets through shared interfaces. For instance, method logf ull of applet Air France calls method getbalance of RentaCar, we will analyse both methods separately. We check that, in the logf ull method of the Air France applet, the level of parameters of the getbalance method invokation is dominated by the level of this interaction (i.e. RC + AF ). And we assume that RC + AF is the level of the result of this method invokation. When we analyse the getbalance method in the RentaCar applet, we will check that the level of the result of this method is dominated by the level of the interaction and we will assume that RC + AF is the level of the parameters of the getbalance method.
We adopt the same discipline for the attributes inside an applet. When an attribute is read, we assume that its level is the security level that was associated with it. When the attribute is modified, we check that the new level is dominated by the security level of this attribute. This assume-guarantee discipline inside an applet allows to verify only a set of selected methods at a time (not the whole applet).
Local Analysis Technique
Our method to verify the security property on the application byte code is based on three elements:
-abstraction: we abstract all values of variables by computed levels; -sufficient condition: we verify an invariant that is a sufficient condition of the security property; -model checking: we verify this invariant by model checking.
We illustrate our technique on a simplified version of Air France logf ull() method. This method directly invokes method getbalance of the RentaCar applet and updates the ExtendedBalance field.
Method void logfull() 0 aload_0 1 invokespecial 108 <Method int getbalance()> 4 istore_1 5 aload_0 6 dup 7 getfield 220 <Field int ExtendedBalance> 10 iload_1 11 iadd 12 putfield 220 <Field int ExtendedBalance> 15 return Abstraction The logf ull() byte code is modelled by an SMV [8] The values of the variables are abstracted into levels. Levels are defined in a module called Levels in such a way that a level is represented by a boolean. Hence the types of abstracted variables are boolean or array of boolean. We do not abstract the value of the program counter that gives the sequencing of instructions, we keep unchanged the value of the stack pointer that gives the index of the first empty slot and the value of the current instruction.
L: levels; pc: -1..9; mem: array 0..1 of boolean; stck: array 0..1 of boolean; sP: -1..1; ByteCode: {invoke_108, load_0, return, nop, store_1, dup, load_1, getfield_220,op, putfield_220};
The byte code execution starts at program location 0. Initially, the stack is empty, the level of the method parameter is stored in memory location 0, it is equal to the level of the interaction we are analysing (i.e. level AF + P ) that is encoded as the conjunction of levels L.AF and L.P . The control loop defines the value of the program counter and of the current instruction. It is an almost direct translation of the Java byte code. When pc is equal to -1 then the execution is finished and the current instruction is nop that does nothing. As in [5] , each instruction we consider models various instructions of the Java byte code. For instance, as we do not care about the type of memory and stack locations, instruction load 0 represents Java instructions (aload i, iload i, lload i,...). Similarly, the op instruction models all the binary operations as (iadd, ladd, iand, ior, ...).
Although methods in the Electronic Purse case study tend to be rather short, the value domain of the pc variable is generally the larger domain in the SMV model we generate. As a large value domain can be a source of state explosion for model checkers, it is interesting to reduce it. We consider that the next value of pc is pc + 1 (except of course in the case of conditional or jump instructions). In this example, the domain of pc is -1..9 that is smaller that the original domain 0..15.
(next(pc), ByteCode):= switch(pc) { -1: (-1, nop); 0: (pc+1, load_0 ); 1: (pc+1, invoke_108 ); 2: (pc+1, store_1 ); 3: (pc+1, load_0 ); 4: (pc+1, dup ); 5: (pc+1, getfield_220 ); 6: (pc+1, load_1 ); 7: (pc+1, op ); 8: (pc+1, putfield_220 ); 9: (-1, return); };
The following section of the SMV model describes the effect of the instructions on the variables. The instructions compute levels for each variable. The load instruction pushes the level of a memory location on the stack, the store instruction pops the top of the stack and stores this level in a memory location, the dup instruction duplicates on the stack the top of the stack. The op instruction computes the least upper bound of the levels of the two first locations of the stack. The least upper bound of levels l1 and l2 is modelled by the disjunction of two levels l1 ∨ l2. The invoke instruction pops from the stack the parameter and pushes onto the stack the result of this method invokation. According to the assume-guarantee discipline, we assume that the level of the result of method getbalance is L.AF ∧ L.RC. Instruction getf ield pushes on the top of the stack the level of attribute ExtendedBalance that is L.AF . And, finally, instruction putf ield pops from the stack the level of attribute ExtendedBalance. 
Invariant
We explained above how to compute a level for each variable. We also explained what security level we assigned to attributes and interactions. The invariant we verify is then that the computed level of variables we want to control is always lower than the authorized level.
For the logfull method we should check two properties: one to verifiy that the interaction between logf ull and getbalance is correct and the other one to check that logf ull correctly uses attribute ExtendedBalance. Property Smethod 108 means that, whenever the current instruction is the invokation of method getbal ance, then the level of the transmitted parameters (the top of the stack) is dominated by the level of the interaction AF + RC. Property Sf ield 220 means that, whenever the current instruction is the modification of field ExtendedBalance, then the level of the new value (the top of the stack) is dominated by the level of the attribute AF .
As logf ull does not return any value, there is no need to verify property Sresult which means that whenever the method is finished the level of the return value (the top of the stack) is dominated by the level of the interaction
Analysis Example
Once we have the abstract model and the invariant, we model check the invariant properties on the model using SMV [8] . If the property does not hold the model checker produces a counter-model that represents an execution of the byte code leading to a state where the property is violated.
A security problem will be detected when checking property Smethod 108 of method logf ull. Indeed, the logf ull interaction between purse and Air France has AF + P level. The getbalance channel has AF + RC level and we detect that the invocation of the getbalance method depends on the invocation of the logf ull method. There is thus an illicit dependency from a variable of level AF + P to an object of level AF + RC (cf figure 6).
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented an approach for the certification of applets that are to be loaded on a Javacard. The security checks we propose are complementary to the security functions already present on the card. The applet firewall controls the interaction between two applets, while our analysis has a more global view and is able to detect illicit information flow between several applets. 
Related work
A lot of work has been going on about security and Java, but to our knowledge, it does not deal with security properties as we understand it in this paper (illicit interactions). Instead, they are concerned with properties like correct typing, no stack overflow, etc. One exception is [6] which proposes a verification of control flows, but does not deal with information flow. Among this work, two kinds of approaches can be distinguished depending on the technique used for the verification. Most of the approaches are based on static analysis techniques, particularly type systems [2, 10] . One approach has used model checking (with SMV) to specify Java byte code [9] but, again, to verify a different kind of properties.
Future work
Future work includes the automatization of the production of an SMV model from Java byte code. However, a complete automatization is hardly possible: an interaction with the user will be needed for the definition of levels (for interactions and attributes).
Another interesting issue is the analysis of results. When SMV produces a counter-example for a security property, we have to study how to interpret this counter-example at the application level.
